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politics 
 
Ben Rosamond 
 
Abstract 
While the field of EU studies has generated a rich theoretical literature, the usefulness of 
analyses of the EU for broader processes of regional governance has been questioned. At the 
same time much recent scholarship on the EU has examined the Union’s external relations as 
opposed to its internal governance. At stake in both of these debates are questions about the 
nature of the EU, what it represents and how it should be conceptualised. By examining the 
conceptual literatures on EU ‘actorness’, the governance of EU external relations and policy 
and academic discourses of comparative regional integration, this paper argues that 
approaches informed by broadly constructivist insights carry significant promise and can help 
to answer questions about the EU’s role in world politics that perplex both the policy and the 
academic imaginations. 
 
Introduction 
In its first half century, academic work on the European Union (hereafter EU studies) 
has generated a rich conceptual literature.1 This is hardly surprising. The EU and its 
antecedents represent – depending on one’s theoretical starting point – either a 
remarkable experiment in post-national governance or a stunning instance of inter-
state co-operation and concomitant institutionalisation. The field of EU studies has 
been shaped by significant theoretical conversations, which have both fed into and 
drawn upon broader debates within political science and International Relations (IR). 
In recent years, the field has engaged in a phase of auto-critique where the supposed 
inadequacies of earlier theoretical efforts – notably the debate between 
neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists – have been identified. One of the key 
themes here has been the claim that IR lacks the capacity to ask appropriate questions 
about the evolving EU, which in this account is better talked about in the vocabularies 
of either classical political science or a newer toolkit associated with the idea of 
‘governance’ (Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004; Hix, 1994; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; 
Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 2004). Meanwhile, the recent dramatic growth of 
studies of comparative regional integration has actively downgraded the status of the 
EU as an exemplar case. In this strand of thought, the EU is depicted as a sui generis 
phenomenon – a peculiarly institutionalised path dependent creature of decisions 
made in the aftermath of World War II. The point here is that the more recent growth 
of regional organisations in world politics is a consequence of newer imperatives that 
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follow the end of the cold war and the rise of globalisation. It follows that we should 
not expect the likes of NAFTA or Mercusor to come to resemble the EU and thus that 
the EU’s long experience offers lessons to neither region-building policy actors to 
academic analysts of regionalism (see inter alia Beeson, 2005; Hettne, 1999; 
Söderbaum and Shaw, 2003). 
 
However, the assertion that the EU’s grip on both the policy and academic 
imaginations should be loosened has become commonplace at the same time as the 
EU itself has emerged as a significant presence in world politics. The biggest growth 
area in EU studies in the last few years has involved research on EU external relations 
and EU foreign policy. Thus, at the precise time when the EU seems to be exercising 
a significant influence over the shape of world politics, we seem to be confronted an 
uneasy separation, if not a full scale divorce between EU studies and the wider study 
of governance and change in the global political economy.  This article undertakes a 
critical review of the conceptual literature – largely developed within EU studies – 
about the EU’s external governance profile to argue for a degree of rethinking. The 
paper deconstructs the phrase ‘EU external governance‘ into four distinctive thematic 
clusters. These might be listed in terms of four sets of questions. First, how does the 
EU manifest itself as a presence/as an actor in world politics/global governance? 
Second, how does the EU regulate its relations with the non-EU? Does it deploy a 
distinctive mode of governance to this end? Is it possible to develop a coherent 
theoretical account of EU external relations? Do rival theoretical schools 
mimic/extend the classic fault lines of integration theory? Third, to what extent does 
the EU itself provide architects of post-national/global governance with a 
template/with a model? Finally, to what extent does the EU help us 
understand/explain the emergent architecture of regional governance in an era of 
globalisation? 
 
The paper supplies a critical review of the extant theoretical literatures around these 
four questions to show that the analytical leverage of using the EU as a starting point 
for comparison/projection is far from exhausted. The paper details the evolution of 
thinking around these questions and shows that the most creative conceptual efforts 
                                                                                                                                            
1 The ideas developed in this article owe much to discussions with Annika Bergman, Shaun Breslin, 
Knud Erik Jørgensen, Ian Manners, Anna Pochylzuk and Alex Warleigh.  
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have emerged from scholars working outside of the rationalist and disciplinary 
mainstreams. The paper argues, therefore, that the theoretical analysis of the EU’s 
governance in the context of the broader global/world/international governance 
system is a useful and vital step in the project of ‘thinking otherwise’ in contemporary 
international studies. 
 
The EU in world politics 
One of the longest standing problems in the study of EU external relations concerns 
the conceptualisation of the EU as an actor. As is well known the EU interacts with 
the non-EU is a variety of ways. There is no uniform or predictable pattern to EU 
actions in, say, its putative foreign policy, its bilateral exchanges with other actions or 
what might be called its foreign economic policy. The impression of variation in 
terms of the manifestations of EU ‘actorness’ is reinforced by two further 
observations. First, who acts on behalf of the EU might be the Commission, the sitting 
Council Presidency or the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) to name but three possibilities. Second, the processes through which 
external actions are produced also vary, suggesting that the projection of the EU to the 
outside is as complex as the variegation that characterises its internal governance. Yet 
the EU undoubtedly creates ‘footprints’ in world politics, whether it be in the form of 
influence over the conduct of global trade politics, the provision of humanitarian or 
development assistance, the creation of common positions or joint actions in the 
sphere of foreign policy or the articulation of ideas about the proper conduct of some 
aspect of global affairs. In other words, these products or footprints are of sufficient 
significance to require academic scrutiny and a pre-requisite for this is the 
development of appropriate conceptual schema.  
 
The problem – long recognised in EU studies – is that conventional IR is built on a 
basic ontological imagery where the basic actors (units) in world politics are states 
and that meaningful interaction is undertaken between states. Mainstream debates in 
IR (such as those between the realist and liberal traditions) tend to revolve around 
disagreements about which forms of interstate conflict and interaction should be 
accorded analytical primacy. The EU is obviously not a state, at least in the sense 
normally understood within the political sciences. Of course, the literature is littered 
with arguments about whether the EU is becoming a conventional state, whether it is 
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evolving into a new or hybrid form of state or whether is should acquire state-like 
characteristics. But perhaps the more fundamental problem is that conventional IR 
expects its core units to exhibit rationality and instrumentality. The EU’s lack of 
coherence in this regard and the absence of clearly discernible EU ‘interests’ explains 
the cautious way in which early discussion of the EU’s international role shied away 
from the noun ‘actorness’ in favour of the looser idea of ‘presence’. In Hill’s oft-cited 
distinction ‘actorness’ is only achieved when an entity is clearly and unequivocally 
distinguished from other entities in the international system (Hill 1994). Moreover, 
Hill argued that ‘actorness’ (particularly in the realm of foreign policy) was only 
achievable when the entity in question made its own laws and when it possessed 
‘legal personality’, a diplomatic corps and the capacity to conduct autonomous 
negotiations with third parties. Hill’s preference for the idea of the EU’s ‘presence’ in 
the international system reflected the observation that the EU lacked these core 
attributes, but that at the same time its impact in world politics was discernible. This 
‘distinctive non-state’ presence, to use White’s phrase (White, 2004: 45), is not only 
about the empirics of actions and outcomes that demonstrate an external projection of 
the EU into the domain of foreign policy broadly defined. As Allen and Smith (1990) 
recognised, it also has much to do with the fact that this presence is regarded as 
legitimate and perceived to be important by other actors in the system.  In so far as the 
EU has actor-like attributes, then it follows that the successful appearance of the EU 
as a factor in world politics has as much to do with the norms of that system as it does 
with the agency of the EU itself. 
 
Herein lies a central paradox for the analyst of EU foreign policy/external relations. 
The recognition rules that accord an entity significance/legitimacy within the 
international system tend to be governed by highly state-centric norms (Jørgensen and 
Rosamond, 2002). The expectation within the system is that actors be state-like. One 
way of thinking about this question follows the argument that to take on the 
appearance of an actor, the EU needs to conform to the system norms. This in turn – 
particularly in overly structuralist accounts – is likely to preclude the possibility of a 
logical external projection of the internal multifaceted EU polity because to be or to 
become within the international system requires a suppression of the 
transformationalist character of the EU. There is also an analytical component to this 
paradox in that conventional theories of international politics (and politics more 
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generally) have an in-built assumption that the nation-state provides s with a norm or 
a benchmark. Thus there is always a danger that the external projection(s) of the EU 
will always be measured against this benchmark in terms of success or failure to 
comply with the pre-existing norm (Manners and Whitman, 2003: 395). At this point 
it is interesting to note the very close correspondence between the analytical 
expectations of conventional theorising and the prevalent policy norms of the 
‘everyday’ international system.  
 
Of course, not all accounts of the internal polity of the EU would subscribe to the 
claim that it is either especially transformative or particularly transcendent of 
established governance mechanisms. For example, one powerful rationalist account 
conceptualises the growth of supranational institutions in principal-agent terms (see 
Pollack, 2003). In this framework, the growth of EU governance is thought to be the 
consequence of deliberate self-regarding action by member-states (principals) which – 
motivated by convergent preferences – delegate common tasks to supranational 
institutions (agents). One corollary would be the suggestion that foreign 
policy/external relations tasks might follow a similar principal-agent logic. Indeed, 
those keen to emphasise the continuing importance of national executives in EU 
policy-making (for example, Moravcsik, 1998) would argue that the extent of 
European institutionalisation (as a manifestation of integration) is always explained 
by the level of preference convergence among the (key) member-states. If, to borrow 
Hill and Smith’s phrase, the EU might be understood as a ‘trading state’ (Hill and 
Smith, 2005b: 12), then the optimisation of the member-states’ collective commercial 
interests might explain external action that seeks to create a stable and predictable 
environment. External action becomes a rational spillover of the EU’s inherent 
purpose. Rationalists might also make hay with the range of actions directed by the 
EU vis-à-vis its ‘near abroad’. Thus the Barcelona Process seeks to create a zone of 
peace and stability in the Mediterranean region via the classically commercial liberal 
mechanism of moving towards a free trade area. Similar, customised actions have 
been developed in relation to other neighbouring regions such as the Balkans and 
South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the so-called Northern 
Dimension (organised principally around the EU’s Russian border). The whole array 
of activities under the heading of ‘transatlantic relations’ could also be read as 
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indicative of deliberate attempts to create a rule bound order for the optimal pursuit of 
collective transnational economic gain (Pollack and Schaffer, 2001).      
 
Thus, conventional rationalist theories can go some way to develop plausible 
hypotheses about the appearance of and evidence for an EU profile in the 
international arena. However, they run into some difficulties, which might be 
summarised as follows. First, rationalism can advance an explanation of why formal 
institutional expressions of an EU external presence appear, but they do not 
necessarily help us understand the particular character of the processes through which 
these mechanisms operate. Or put another way, they have been accused of ignoring 
significant and peculiar attributes of EU foreign policy broadly defined, thereby 
tending to force the analysis of the EU’s international role(s) into conventional – and 
possibly misleading – frameworks (this is discussed in the next section). Second, 
rationalist explanations might be able to account for many aspects of external 
economic governance or even the growth of the EU as provider of particular foreign 
policy/external relations specialisms in areas such as development assistance, but how 
do we account for the remarkable appearance of a military dimension to EU external 
action in the form of the ESDP, and what is going on when the EU manifests itself 
within the US legal system as an advocate of the abolition of the death penalty 
(Manners, 2002)? What is at stake here is the constitution of actorness. This leads to a 
third point: the fact that there are multiple ways in which the EU makes an appearance 
in world politics. As White (2004: 45) notes, it is imprudent to think about the EU as 
an actor or a presence or even a singular identity. It is not just that the EU projects 
itself in different substantive ways. As will be noted below, it is also about the 
concepts of the EU that are being projected and the normative receptiveness of the 
international system to such projections.  
 
The EU’s governance of the non-EU 
The field of EU studies has become increasingly preoccupied with understanding the 
mechanisms through which the Union manages its external relations and foreign 
policy activities (Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White, 2004; Hill and Smith, 2005a; Smith, 
2003). Inevitably this literature has developed a number of generalisations and has 
sought to generate theoretical as well as empirical insights. The key question for this 
section involves the relationship between the character of the EU’s external projection 
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and the quality of available theoretical accounts. The previous section has already 
suggested that the portfolio of classic rationalist theories might not be able to deal 
with the peculiarly complex and multiple ways in which the EU manifests itself in 
world politics (see also Manners and Whitman, 2003). Realist theories of international 
relations expect nothing less than rational coherent state-like entities to be the only 
significant actors in politics beyond the nation-state. Liberals and regime theorists 
anticipate the rise of international co-operation and are more comfortable with a 
variegated pattern of actors. But states’ activities and the rational pursuit of state 
interests (which contra realism may have a commercial as well as a security rationale) 
remain the key motors of world politics (Andreatta, 2005; Tonra and Christiansen, 
2004). It takes quite a radical leap to loosen the core assumptions of state-centred 
traditions of foreign policy analysis to develop a transformed conceptual framework 
that can cope with the curiosities of the EU (though see White, 2004a; 2004b for the 
most explicit attempts to do just that). These caveats might also apply to the 
mainstream and long-standing theories of integration. We have already seen that 
(liberal) intergovernmentalism (a liberal institutionalist as opposed to realist theory) 
would conceptualise the external projection of the EU as a consequence of co-
operative, rational, interest-driven activity by the member-states. Neofunctionalism, 
on the other hand, is principally a theory of region building (see below), and so does 
not have a obviously available account of EU external governance. Newer 
conceptualisations of the EU are largely products of the broader intellectual move to 
analyse the EU from within, as a polity (either recognisable or novel). That said, some 
attempts have been made to generate conceptualisations of EU foreign policy that 
draw upon the insights of concepts such as multi-level governance (Smith, 2004)..  
 
There would seem to be three issues that make life difficult for the theoretically 
minded analyst of EU external activity. First, as Jørgensen (2004b: 42) notes, 
analytical leverage is difficult to obtain using conventional theories of foreign policy 
because of the peculiar, potentially sui generis character of EU external relations (see 
also Knodt and Princen, 2003: Jørgensen, 2004a; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004). 
Social scientific protocol demands that research be analytical rather than purely 
descriptive. The problem with discussions of sui generis phenomena is that they are 
likely to be inherently descriptive. This does not mean that the phenomenon or event 
is beyond analytical capture. Rather the task of the social scientist is to recast the 
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investigation so that the phenomenon becomes an instance of something (Rosenau 
and Durfee, 1995)..The difficulty then becomes a matter of ‘an instance of what?’ The 
resolution of that question is partly empirical and will be grounded in observation of 
the phenomenon under investigation, but it is also a matter of theoretical choice and 
ultimately of the openness of the analyst to a diverse range of theoretical possibilities. 
Here this first issue of the sui generis character of EU external relations runs into the 
second and third issues. 
 
The second issue then is about what we observe when we examine EU external 
relations/foreign policy. A few key findings – in addition to the general observation 
about variegation and complexity – are worth noting. First, in foreign and security 
policy, it is no longer appropriate to narrate the EU’s operation purely in terms of the 
formal treaty description. This is not an instance of standard intergovernmental 
exchange, but apparently a concerted effort to upgrade common tasks, which in turn 
has yielded an alternative (perhaps a post-) diplomatic culture among the participating 
member-states. Second, consensus building rather than fiercely differentiated national 
interests is the foreign policy norm in contemporary Europe – and this culture is less 
recent than might be supposed (Jørgensen, 1997; Nuttall, 1992; Tonra, 2001). Third, 
EU external activity – in all domains – is highly discursive. It is aspirational, 
declaratory and full of positioning statements:     
 
Across EU documents a discourse can be identified according to which the 
Union is constructed as a unit which defends its own interests and has an 
obligation to take on responsibilities in the light of international challenges 
(Larsen, 2004: 67). 
 
In other words, much of the effort of the EU’s external projection involves the 
announcement of the significance of that external projection and the claim that the EU 
is a coherent and purposive actor  (Jørgensen, 2004b: 12). Also, the assertion of 
coherence and purpose is all fields of external action/governance does not preclude 
the projection of multiple and sometimes contradictory roles, suggesting (a) a 
discursive struggle to define the substantive way in which the EU should impact upon 
the world (Rosamond, 1999) and/or (b) alternative components of the EU’s 
international identity that relate what it is to how it acts (Manners and Whitman, 
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2003).  Fourth, the language of ‘Europe’ has become pervasive and feeds back in 
significant and transformative ways into the domestic discourses and practices of 
foreign policy within the member-states (Tonra, 2001: Wæver, 2000; 2005; see also 
Herrmann, Risse and Brewer, 2004). Fifth, there is evidence that foreign policy actors 
themselves understand their actions as being about the construction of a European 
identity and their field of action as being ‘European’ foreign policy-making (White, 
2001). Finally, there is a highly normative dimension to EU external action. By that is 
meant that many of the EU’s external relations activities can be read as attempts to 
shape conceptions of ‘the normal’ in international politics.  (Manners, 2002; Manners 
and Whitman, 2003: Smith, 2003). 
 
These are obviously selected highlights and the foregoing is a rather partial account of 
the key findings in EU external relations research. However, they have been chosen 
deliberately because these features of EUI external governance are either difficult to 
explain using a conventional rationalist political science repertoire or – perhaps more 
importantly – they are observations that might not be regarded as significant within 
the frameworks of such theories. To take one example, Larsen (2004: 69) remarks that 
the discursive character of EU foreign policy might be regarded as epiphenomenal 
and simply rhetorical within mainstream rationalist work.  The point for many 
constructivists and discourse analysts is that the discursive quality of EU external 
action is the most distinctive and significant aspect of EU foreign policy.  
 
This brings us to the third issue under this heading: theoretical choice. The set of 
findings was deliberately chosen because they all come from work that departs from 
the rationalist mainstream. In other words, analysts have conceptualised EU external 
relations in particular ways and arrived at potentially significant results because they 
have asked certain sorts of questions. Much of this is accounted for by the recent 
constructivist turn in international and European studies (Christiansen, Jørgensen and 
Wiener, 2001) and by the application of insights from contemporary social theory to 
the analysis of the EU (Kelstrup and Williams, 2000; Linklater, 2005; Manners and 
Whitman, 2003). Within IR, constructivism has been concerned with understanding 
the social bases of international politics. The way that actors conceive of themselves, 
of other and of their environment is crucial to the conduct of that politics. This 
upgrades the significance of ideas, knowledge, intersubjectivities and discourses. 
 9
Institutions become venues for socialisation rather than simply the rational exchange 
of preferences. Indeed the creation of interests and identities is endogenous to 
institutionalised interaction (whereas rationalist theories tend to treat interests as 
exogenous). Such theoretical moves appear to allow for the solution of the sui generis 
problem as well as relaxing significantly the idea of the EU as a unitary instrumental 
actor in international affairs. So, for example, we can re-conceive of the CFSP as a 
zone of communicative action (Jørgensen, 2004b). Meanwhile it is possible to 
recognise that the EU is not an actor in the conventional sense, but to find interesting 
to process through which it seeks to wrestle for a form of agency, bound by prevailing 
ideational structures that dictate what an actor should be. It is this shift from the 
analysis of the EU’s being to its becoming that is perhaps the most helpful side effect 
of the social theoretical move.       
 
The EU as a model 
The foregoing has focussed on those actions or activities by which the EU appears as 
an entity in world politics or through which it creates an impact. This, of course, 
presupposes action (be it purposive or unintentional) that produces either of these 
effects. However, the EU also arguably shapes the international system by simple 
virtue of its very existence. Analytically, this tends to beg the question of what the EU 
is an instance of, if anything – a question to which several answers are possible 
(Rosamond, 2000: 14-18). A standard social scientific approach would then involve 
the analysis of whether analogous phenomena are present or have been present in the 
international system as a basis for further comparative work. Yet, it is important not to 
lose sight of the ways in which the EU, as a ready-made exemplar, affects the 
perceptions of actors within international politics. Most obviously, this boils down to 
the extent that the EU offers a model – to be either emulated or avoided. What is 
interesting – from a constructivist viewpoint – is that, in this context, the question of 
the nature of the EU (that which might be emulated or avoided) is not necessarily 
settled. Thus part of the international politics of the EU, which is often overlooked, is 
a struggle over the presentation of what the EU model is. The various competing 
images of the EU tend to diverge over two things: (a) the description of its structures 
and processes and (b) the assertion of its normative substance. 
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As far as the first of these is concerned, the default assumption amongst policy actors 
is that the EU is a heavily institutionalised form of governance, reliant on a delicate 
compromise between supranational and intergovernmental forces. This, in essence, is 
a description of the ‘Monnet model’ or the community method – the classic textbook 
presentation of how the EU works. In so far as region-builders elsewhere refer to the 
EU in their deliberations, it has been commonplace to dismiss the European variant as 
institutionally top-heavy, as a relic of particular deliberations in a particular region at 
particular time. Most scholars of European governance would offer a corrective at this 
point to note that there is rather more to EU policy-making that the cumbersome 
1950s engineering of the Monnet model, and in any case the Monnet model itself has 
developed in quite subtle and often surprising ways since its formalisation in the 
founding treaties. Yet, what is also striking is the way that this caricature of what the 
EU model is has become embedded in some of the EU’s own discourse. The Prodi 
Commission (1999-2004) made particular play of the virtues of the EU model of 
governance: 
 
Our European model of integration is the most developed in the world. 
Imperfect though it still is, it nevertheless works on a continental scale. Given 
the necessary institutional reforms, it should continue to work well after 
enlargement, and I believe we can make a convincing case that it would also 
work globally (Prodi, 2000: 4). 
 
Similarly, the Commission White Paper on Governance (2000) also quite clearly 
positioned itself as contributing to the debate about how the Community Method 
might be strengthened. The point is that, notwithstanding the sheer complexity of EU 
governance mechanisms, policy actors both within and beyond the EU construct the 
EU in quite particular and arguably partial terms. The research task would then be to 
ask why these particular constructions? Do they represent knowing discursive 
strategies of policy elites or, on the contrary, to they simply follow from an 
intersubjective consensus on what the EU is? 
 
In contrast to the one dimensional representations of the EU’s governance structure 
favoured in conventional policy discourse, recent scholarship on the EU has suggested 
that it possesses multiple, co-existent modes of governance (Wallace, 2005). The 
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evolving community method is one of these, but in Wallace’s analysis there are at 
least four other modes at work in the EU polity: a regulatory model of negative 
market integration, a redistributive mode associated with regional and agricultural 
policy sectors, a form of policy co-ordination associated with the Open Method of Co-
ordination and ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’, found most obviously in areas of 
high politics that are largely immune from excessive supranational intrusion.   
 
The intimate interplay between EU and non-EU in terms of the footprints each leaves 
upon the other is transformed if we begin to think about the EU’s multiple modes of 
governance in ‘balance of trade’ terms. These policy modes can be thought of as 
either policy methodological imports into the EU from elsewhere or European-
devised policy methods that may have a broader application. If we focus simply on 
variant 1 (the Monnet/Community model), then we become rather hopelessly trapped 
in the fatal n = 1 hole where the formal replication of supranational and 
intergovernmental institutions simply does not happen elsewhere. However, if we 
think about regulation or ‘benchmarking’, the story is somewhat different. Here we 
have instances of the EU adopting policy methods from the US or some of its member 
states (in the case of regulation) or from international organisations such as the OECD 
(in the case of ‘benchmarking’). transgovernmentalism is especially interesting 
because it occurs in areas that are formally intergovernmental in terms of treaty 
stipulations (the so-called pillars II and III of the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union) or require a high level of co-ordination between national executives (EMU). 
However, portraying interactions in these areas as ‘intergovernmental’ in the 
traditional sense is misleading in so far as it cannot capture the substantial 
interpenetration of national executives and bureaux that takes place. Nor can the 
traditional diplomatic discourse of intergovernmentalism understand the ongoing 
multi- and bi-lateral interactions that take place between member-state governments. 
From this brief survey, we can conclude (a) that there is no single EU mode of 
governance and, therefore, (b) that the external projection of the EU’s governance 
identity is far from straightforward. Moreover, (c) in terms of governance models, the 
EU does not simply practice a weird, internally-generated, path dependent mode, but 
rather (d) its governance  practice is part of a broader global exchange of governance 
methodologies. This yields at least two significant observations. First, the study of 
comparative regional integration need not carry its usual (n = 1) caveats about the EU 
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(this is discussed further in the next section). Second, the external projection of the 
EU is about rather more than actions that simply follow from internally generated 
policies.  
 
Similar questions are directly applicable to constructions of the normative substance 
of the EU. Rival understandings are routinely played out in the internal politics of the 
EU (such as in the recent debates over the Constitutional Treaty), but they are also 
key to the external projection of the EU. For example the idea – propagated within 
some member states and certain parts of the Commission – that the EU should exist to 
protect a solidaristic, institutionalised ‘European social model’ is a form of self-
identification and role attribution that relies in turn upon a depiction of the external 
environment which is usually construed in such discourse as a brutally neoliberal 
globalised economy (Rosamond, forthcoming). This discourse also has an outward 
orientation, reflected in the EU becoming a dialogue partner with bodies such as the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) to deliberate issues such as core labour 
standards and corporate social responsibility. But this view is also involved in a  
perpetual struggle with a neoliberal representation of the EU as bastion of liberal 
market discipline and a champion of open regionalism and global economic 
institutions (Rosamond, 1999; 2005a).  
 
Manners and Whitman (2003) have gone some way to thinking about the ways in 
which this kind of discussion of the external representation of the EU might be tied to 
the earlier long-standing debates about ‘actorness’ and ‘presence’. They place 
considerable emphasis upon the so-called ‘reflexive ‘ (as opposed to ‘active’) 
dimension of the EU’s international identity. The key for Manners and Whitman is to 
understand ‘how the EU is constituted, constructed and represented internationally’ 
(2003: 383). In other words, a full appreciation of the EU’s external projection 
involves an understanding that how the EU appears internationally is a function of 
three interrelated and constantly fluctuating phenomena: (a) its core constitutive 
principles, (c) how it is conceptualised and (c) how it and others represent the EU. 
The point is that these broadly social/intersubjective and ideational factors are crucial 
in mediating the relations between the EU and the non-EU. What the EU is and what 
kind of model it might be is far from static. Rather these issues are the result of 
ongoing multi-level discursive exchange. 
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 Analysing the EU and the architecture of new regional governance 
It is not entirely inappropriate to say that the first serious academic studies of 
European integration in the 1950s and earl 1960s were exercises in an emergent 
comparative project. The explicit aim of neofunctionalists such as Haas was to 
develop explanations of the dynamics of regional integration. Initially, at least, the 
European experience would be a rich source of hypotheses to be tested elsewhere. The 
story of how this project unravelled is much told and is presumably very well known. 
The normal argument is that while the neofunctionalists uncovered some localised 
spillover dynamics in the first phase of the Communities, these did not prove to be 
enduring and their application beyond the European case was patchy to the point of 
threadbare. Within EU studies there has been a long-standing tradition of auto-critique 
that tends to bracket first phase integration theory as, at best, a heroic yet misguided 
intellectual project. It, therefore, cautions against the re-ignition of approaches such as 
neofunctionalism that seek analytical leverage by seeking to compare the EU with 
other cases of regional integration. Meanwhile, as the study of comparative regional 
integration has revived in the face of so-called second wave regionalism, its 
practitioners have been quick to dismiss EU studies and its theoretical efforts as 
inappropriate starting points. Thus the status quo is characterised by a situation where 
EU studies is utterly sceptical about treating the EU as an instance of regional 
integration while meanwhile contributors to the ‘new regionalism’ literature are 
unhappy with identifying the EU as a case (paradigmatic or otherwise) of ‘second 
wave’ regionalism (although see Beeson, 2005).  
 
There are undoubted merits in much of the work that seeks uncover the dynamics of 
the new regionalism. Its lack of Euro-centricity is obviously sensible. Moreover, as 
two of the primary discussants of the new regionalism note, part of the agenda of 
recent studies has been to think about how a region constitutes itself into a purposive 
entity or ‘how a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active 
subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region’ 
(Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 461). However, this process could easily describe the 
EU’s story as an emergent economy in possession of its own economic subjects that 
competes with other economies or as a participant in multi-lateral institutions or as an 
embryonic military actor, albeit one imbued with a particular moral purpose. Perhaps 
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the problem is not that the study of the EU is not helpful for the scholar of new 
regionalism in a blanket sense, but rather that the approaches that have prevailed in 
the study of the EU have not been especially pertinent. In short, the analyst and the 
scholar are potentially significant players in the ways in which the EU is represented, 
constructed and construed.  
 
There are two more important observations that should be made in this section. The 
first is that the supposed analytical utility of the EU for studies of comparative 
regional governance has been downgraded by reciprocal discursive constructions in 
two distinct fields. EU studies’ refusal to countenance EU governance as having 
anything to do with regional integration has legitimised the impression, in those parts 
of IPE and IR that deal with the new regionalism, that EU studies has nothing to offer. 
This point has been made recently with great eloquence by Alex Warleigh 
(forthcoming) who develops a strong argument to suggest that IR – even that which 
self consciously and strenuously seeks to ‘think otherwise’ about world politics and 
which is open to the notion that we are living in a post-Westphalian era – has been 
largely blind to the acquis academique in EU studies. His point is that EU studies 
predominantly involves work – debated, published, debated some more – that offers a 
rich set of ideas and concepts about governance beyond the state, the re-calibration of 
authority, the interplay between international institutions, governmental actors and 
domestic polities, the possibilities for post-national democracy and post national 
demoi and the role of law and legal institutions in international governance. In other 
words, the study of regional or international governance elsewhere can draw on EU 
scholarship without necessarily buying into the assumption that the EU is the 
benchmark case. There are some interesting analogies in this sociology of knowledge 
discussion with the points made earlier about the relaxation of the idea that the EU is 
represented by a singular governance mode. 
 
The second observation that has implications for the reinstatement of the EU is the 
study of regional governance revolves around the simple suggestion that, rather than  
being dismissed, the classics of European integration theory should be re-read. Put 
simply, the prevailing image of 1960s/1970s neofunctionalism is overly static, 
overstates the centrality of the spillover dynamic and marginalises the substantial 
interest that early integration theorists displayed in mapping comparative background 
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conditions that could explain either the prevalence or dissolution of regional 
integration projects (see Rosamond, 2005b for a fuller argument). The key here is to 
understand that the construction of ‘the EU model’ is not simply an act where the 
object of study is given the best available description by academic practitioners.  
Rather, those same practitioners are also involved in adjudicating the representation of 
the field of study – its history and its conception of progress. This means that 
potentially interesting lines of enquiry – in this case of continuing use to the scholar 
of comparative regional governance – are collectively ‘forgotten’ in the quest to 
represent the story of the field (EU studies) in a particular way.  
 
Conclusions 
The projection of the EU into world politics and its governance of the non-EU remain 
particularly complex puzzles for students of international politics. The argument here 
has been to suggest that an open-minded, broadly constructivist framework is an 
essential part of any attempt to engage intellectually with these processes. Standard 
rationalist discussions grounded in IR orthodoxy have two broad problems. The first 
is that they struggle to escape from a notion of ‘actorness’ that is not only welded to 
the norms of Westphalian statehood, but also understands actors as purposive, 
rational, unitary and motivated by exogenous material interests. The second is that 
they are inherently shy about analysing the role of subjectivity in social relations. One 
of the key lessons about the practice of EU external relations and the policy 
discourses that surround outward projections of the EU and others’ interpretations of 
it is the significance of ontological claims about the nature of the EU. So the question 
should be shifted from thinking about what kind of actor the EU is or what kind of 
model it represents to the construction and representation of the EU and how it is 
thought relate to the world system.   
 
There are also some telling lessons about structure and agency in this type of 
discussion. One of the claims here is that there is a reciprocal and dialectical 
relationship between the EU and global politics. The EU, through its ongoing 
practice, projects images of how a transformed future polity might be and what its 
modes of politics could/should become. As we find routinely within EU discourse, 
there is a consciousness that the experience of the EU represents an exemplar of what 
might ‘be otherwise’ in world politics. More concretely, the EU stands – self-
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consciously sometimes – as a beacon of what it might mean to engage in the post-
Westphalian governance of globalisation (Manners and Whitman, 2003). It is in this 
sense a normative transmitter to the rest of the word. And yet it has to exist and 
function within a world not of its making whose commonsensical norms continue to 
be couched in (oftentimes fundamentalist) Westphalian terms. Not only its 
effectiveness but also the acknowledgement of its existence, of its legitimacy as an 
actor-participant in world politics is conditional upon its placement within an 
established politics of recognition. 
 
Both academic and policy imaginations can conceive of the EU’s substantive actions 
and normative purposes in a variety of ways. But they also conceptualise the EU as a 
case of regional integration, whether as a policy or an analytical exemplar. Here again 
the role of representations and constructions becomes important, although perhaps in 
slightly different ways. Within policy discussions it is clear that the EU status as a 
regional governance regime worthy of emulation is seriously contestable. Within 
academic discussions, involving both EU studies and comparative integration studies, 
the EU’s usefulness as an analytical starting point has been seriously questioned. Yet, 
interestingly, the downgrading of the EU in this sense is reliant on particular (and 
arguably erroneous) constructions and representations of the past of EU 
studies/integration theory. In other words, the insights of a broad open-minded 
constructivism might usefully be applied to not only the objects of study, but also 
those studies themselves. 
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